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INTRODUCTION

In a symposium on Competency and the Law, a paper on the
ethics of autonomy in long-term care may seem out of place. Certainly, there is no immediate connection between the ethical issues in
the organization of nursing homes and the legal issue of competency.
Yet, competency is a central concept with important implications for
issues such as informed consent, decisions to terminate life supports,
or surrogate decisionmaking.' The legal and ethical dictum that competent patients should be allowed to make health care decisions for
themselves reveals the close connection between competency and
autonomous decisionmaking.2
We would like to suggest that, at least in some settings, focusing
solely on decisionmaking is not optimal if one wishes to promote
patient autonomy. We will argue that the traditional model of
* We wish to thank Lynn Fischer for her work on the larger project and George Agich
and Lissa Wettick for their thoughtful comments on different drafts. The work for this Article
was partially supported by a grant from the Retirement Research Foundation. Parts of this
Article are also contained in our book, THE EROSION OF AUTONOMY IN LONG-TERM CARE
(1992).
1. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL
PRACTICE (1987); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES L. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS (1979); DAN W. BROCK & ALLEN E. BUCHANAN, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE
ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING (1989); Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency
to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 20

(1982) [hereinafter

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
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informed consent is largely irrelevant to the promotion of autonomy
in the daily lives of elderly patients. This suggests that traditional
conceptions of competency, which are invariably tied to decisionmaking, should play a much less central role in the law and ethics of
autonomy, at least in the nursing home setting. Instead of focusing
on decisionmaking, we will argue that more attention needs to be paid
to an alternative conception of autonomy, autonomy as consistency,
and to the institutional factors .that promote elderly persons' abilities
to engage in activities consistent with their commitments, values and
life plans. We hope this Article will prompt policy analysts to reexamine how policy and legal reforms affect the autonomy of elderly
patients who live in institutions.
A.

The Central Role of Autonomy in Bioethics

In the last two decades, a new value, which largely overshadows
concern with other issues, has been introduced into the discussion of
health care law and ethics-patient autonomy.4 In contrast to older
legal and ethical models of health care, which emphasize the prevention of malpractice and physicians' obligation to provide the correct
and needed treatment, the new autonomy-based model requires health
care providers to focus on implementing the patients' decisions. The
ethical task of the health care provider changes from an obligation to
determine what is objectively best for the patient to determining what
the patient wants.
Seeking the patient's permission prior to instituting treatment
promotes the patient's autonomy by treating a decision about the
therapeutic plan as, ultimately, the choice of the patient and not of
the physician. The opinion in Nathanson v. Kline eloquently states
the connection to autonomy:
Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough going
self-determination. It follows that each man [sic] is considered to

be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind,
expressly prohibit the performance of life saving surgery, or other
medical treatment. A doctor may well believe that an operation or
other form of treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does

not permit him to substitute his own judgment for that of the
3. Since many, maybe most, long-term nursing home residents have substantially
diminished cognitive capacity, a focus on decisionmaking autonomy suggests that autonomy is
irrelevant to most long-term nursing home settings for the elderly. One virtue of our model is
that it is not as restrictive as a competency-based model of autonomy.
4. Caroline Whitbeck, Why the Attention to Paternalismin MedicalEthics, 10 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 184, 181-84 (1985).
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Like most arguments in law and ethics, support for decisionmaking autonomy in health care is justified both consequentially and
deontologically. 6 First, respecting an autonomous decision is valued
for its likely consequences. Contrary to the conception of well-being
found in the Hippocratic Oath, allowing people to select their own
treatment maximizes patients' best interests.' This is the traditional
liberal argument that individuals are better judges of their own interests than even the most benevolent others.' Best interest is seen not as
an objectively determined, unified notion but as definable only in the
context of a particular person's goals and values. A particular professional's concept of health is not always in the patient's best interests.
Individuals may feel that striving for health is not as important as
staying comfortable or spending time engaged in other pursuits. Even
when the importance of promoting health is undisputed, a variety of
approaches may be available, depending on the individual's non-medical goals. Given the subjective nature of "best interest," most supporters of autonomous decisionmaking argue that those whose
interests are at stake are best qualified to determine the proper goals
of medical therapy.
However, it is often argued that the reasons for respecting autonomy transcend its instrumental value. 9 Even assuming that the
patient is competent, there are many situations in which an outside
expert might make better decisions than a patient concerning the
patient's best interest. Yet, some deontologists would argue, even in
these situations, autonomous decisionmaking by the patient is preferable. It is intrinsically good to allow individuals to direct their own
lives. 10

Subjectively, one experiences this sense of autonomy as not wanting to be "pushed around," "manipulated," or "deceived." One
desires to define values and decide how to act to achieve goals even if
these decisions are sometimes incorrect. This value is deeply
ingrained in cultural ideals throughout the western world, I I particularly in the United States.' 2 There is a growing agreement among
5. Nathanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (1960).
6. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 55-56.

7. Id. at 60-61.
8. JOHN S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 93 (C. Shields ed., 1956).
9. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 22-23 (1989).

10. KANT ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY 163-65 (Brendan E.A. Liddell trans.,

1970).
11. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 407-08 (George Simpson
trans., 1964).
12. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 129-33 (1945).
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medical ethicists and many practicing physicians that autonomous
patient decisionmaking is an important part of health care.

II.

THE AMBIGUITY OF AUTONOMY

Although it may be clear why autonomy is important in making
health care decisions, it is far from clear what the term means.
Autonomy is derived from the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule or
governance or law), and was first used to refer to self-rule in Greek
city-states. Political autonomy for the Greek city-states was, perhaps,
as important to the Greeks as personal autonomy is to Americans.
We will return to this concept because the analogy to the independence of a political entity is very helpful in thinking about aspects of
personal autonomy that have been largely overlooked in the medical
ethics literature.
Perhaps because the concept of autonomy has departed so far
from it origins, the concept as used in ethics is far from clear. Its
ambiguity is reflected in the diversity of definitions found among leading authorities. For example, the President's Commission defines
autonomy or self-determination as "an individual's exercise of the
capacity to form, revise and pursue personal plans for life"; 13
Beauchamp and Childress define autonomy as "being one's own person, without constraint either by another's action or by psychological
or physical limitations"; 4 J.L. Lucas says "I, and I alone, am ultimately responsible for the decisions I make and am in that sense
autonomous"; 5 while recent theorists such as Gerald Dworkin and
George Agich have characterized autonomy as the ability to identify
with the decisions that one makes. 16 Other theorists, such as Collopy
and Thomasma, define autonomy not as a unitary concept but as a
group of related notions.' 7 It is apparent that autonomy is being used
in a very broad and ambiguous manner. As Gerald Dworkin points
out:

It is equated with dignity, integrity, individuality, independence,
responsibility, and self-knowledge. It is identified with qualities of
self-assertion, with critical reflection, with freedom from obliga13. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 44.
14. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 1, at 59.
15. J.R. LUCAS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICS 101 (1966).
16. See GEORGE J. AGICH, AUTONOMY AND LONG-TERM CARE (forthcoming 1994);
DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 6.
17. See Bart J. Collopy, Autonomy in Long-Term Care: Some Crucial Distinctions, 28
GERONTOLOGIST 10 (1988); David C. Thomasma, Beyond Medical Paternalism and Patient
Autonomy: A Model of Physician Conscience for the Physician-Patient Relationship, 98
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243 (1983).
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tion, with absence of external causation, with knowledge of one's
own interests. It is even equated by some economists with the
impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. It is related to actions,
to beliefs, to reasons for acting, to rules, to the will of other persons, to thoughts, and to principles. About the only features held
constant from one author to another are that autonomy is-a feature
of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.'
Concerns with clarity of definition may simply be a fixation of
philosophers and other academics. What difference does it really
make, to either law or practice, whether or not we have a clear definition? The answer is that what we do to honor an individual's autonomy is determined by our definition of it. If autonomy means dignity,
then what we do to honor the individual's autonomy is quite different
than if it means self-knowledge.
In assessing different concepts of autonomy, one needs to be
aware that scholars have defined autonomy for various purposes. 19
Some have defined autonomy for the purpose of exploring different
systems of governance. In health care law and ethics, conceptions of
autonomy are typically used to delineate patients' rights to make
health care decisions for themselves. The definitions of autonomy are
used to determine who can make such decisions (competence) and
what health care professionals must do to respect autonomy
(informed consent).
Our interest in autonomy is somewhat different. We have been
concerned with how long-term care institutions for the elderly can be
structured so as to maximize their inhabitants' autonomy. For reasons that will become clear shortly, this concern turned our focus
away from models of autonomy that centered around discrete decisionmaking and toward a model that looked at the relationship
between patients' lives and their goals and commitments. This, in
turn, has caused us to consider the autonomy-promoting effect of an
entire system of care as opposed to a single discussion between professional and patient. Thus, we concentrate on facets of autonomy that
are different from those of most theorists who have been concerned
with acute care issues.2° In order to understand better the problems
involved, we undertook a participant observation study of long-term
18. See

DWORKIN,

supra note 9, at 6.

19. THE INNER CITADEL: ESSAYS ON INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY 5-6 (John Christman ed.,
1989).
20. For others with similar concerns, see AGICH, supra note 16; Harry R. Moody, From
Informed Consent to Negotiated Consent, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 64 (1988); see also Whitbeck,
supra note 4.
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elderly care settings that have been reported elsewhere.21 We found
that residents in the nursing home had very little autonomy of any
sort. The difficulties in promoting their autonomy seemed more
profound than those usually discussed in the medical ethics literature.
Our goal here is to explore the ramifications for the general concept of
autonomy in health care law and ethics that arise from trying to apply
autonomy models to the analysis of the social institution of the nursing home. This requires a brief summary of the current models of
autonomy in medical ethics.
III.

THREE MODELS OF AUTONOMY

A.

Total Independence

Many philosophers conceptualize autonomy synonymously with
independence from external influences; to be autonomous means one
is radically self-sufficient, dependent on no one else.22 Autonomous
persons are independent, self-ruled entities who make decisions based
solely on their own reasons. 3 Indeed, such a concept seems to be
nothing but an elaboration of the concept of self-direction. What
could be more desirable than total freedom?
Appealing and clear as such a conception of autonomy may be, it
is more a mythical fantasy than a usable model of human activity. All
human life takes place in a historical, social and cultural context.24
Individuals' values and actions are necessarily affected by their past
and environment. People do not autonomously choose their genetic
background, their parents, the time period or society in which they
are born or raised. All these factors place limits on the persons they
are and will become, and make the notion of an independent, selfruled person unrealistic. Dworkin summarizes this objection by
stating:
If this is what moral autonomy demands, then it is impossible on
both empirical and conceptual grounds. On empirical grounds this
view defines our history. We are born in a given environment with
a given set of biological endowments. We mature more slowly
than other animals and are deeply influenced by parents, siblings,
peers, culture, class, climate, school, accident, genes and the accu21. CHARLES W. LIDZ ET AL., THE EROSION OF AUTONOMY IN LONG-TERM CARE
(1992).
22. See LUCAS, supra note 15; ROBERT P. WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 14, 41
(1970). For a critique of this view in the philosophical literature, see AGICH, supra note 16;
DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 34-47.
23. See LUCAS, supra note 15.
24. JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMITS OF CRIMINAL LAW 38-39

(1986).
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mulated history of the specifics. It makes no sense to suppose we
invent the moral law for ourselves than to suppose that we invent
the language we speak for ourselves.2 5
Moreover such an ideal violates Kant's categorical imperative.
One cannot consistently will that everyone should behave according
to such a maxim. It is impossible to imagine a society made up of
such people. Peoples choices will inevitably influence others, and thus
the claim of one person for such independence would interfere with
another's freedom. Such a position makes it difficult to justify and
enforce simple elements of socially acceptable behavior children are
taught, such as sharing, "taking turns" and politeness.
Instead of equating autonomy with absolute independence, we
will look at more complicated notions of autonomy, which recognize
that individuals are socially and historically situated, bound together
by ties of tradition and mutual obligation. Rather than asking
whether one's actions were influenced by others, we will be concerned
with how those influences affected one's actions and whether the
influences subverted one's control, reasoning process or identification.
B.

Autonomy as Free Action

Free action implies that the activities involved are both intentional and voluntary.2 6 Activities are intentional if they are undertaken with a desired end that the actor believes they will facilitate.
Intentional acts are not events that merely happen to people. Moreover, it is not necessary for the intended end to be realized. Many
intended acts do not realize their goals. Intentional actions are also
different from accidental actions. If someone mistakenly drinks a
glass of arsenic instead of lemonade, it cannot be claimed that she
intended to commit suicide.
The act must occur because the individual wanted to do it rather
than because others forced the person to do it. But defining "force" is
not easy. Faden and Beauchamp address the question by examining
the polar extremes of completely voluntary and involuntary acts.
An involuntary act is one in which the person is completely dominated by an external agent. A voluntary act is one that either has not
been the target of an influence attempt or, if it has been the target of
such an attempt, where the attempt has been unsuccessful or did not
25. See DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 36.
26. Bruce L. Miller, Autonomy and the Refusal of Lifesaving Treatment, 11 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 22, 24 (1981).
27. RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED

CONSENT 258-59 (1986). For a different view, see Joel Feinberg, Law Paternalism, in
PATERNALISM 1-18 (Rolf E. Sartorius ed., 1983).
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deprive the actor in any way of willing what she wished to do or
believe. 28 This definition of voluntariness does not exclude all external pressures. External influences can affect a person without rendering an action involuntary if the person acts on the basis of what she
wants rather than on the basis of an external agent's will.
The problem, as Faden and Beauchamp note, is that such clear
cases are rare.29 Most actions fall somewhere in between the completely voluntary and involuntary extremes. A continuum exists
between voluntary and involuntary acts and, correspondingly,
between autonomous and non-autonomous acts. In reality, an action
may be more or less influenced.
Many authors delineate three groups of external influences. 30 At
one extreme are coercive influences. 3' By presenting a threat of
unwanted and unavoidable harm that a person will be unable to resist,
the coercer gains control over another's actions. These influences
render the action involuntary and hence non-autonomous. For example, threatening to tie patients into a geri-chair if they do not participate in music therapy probably renders subsequent participation
involuntary. At the other extreme are persuasive influences. 32 These
are attempts to influence a decision by appealing to reason and, in the
final analysis, they still leave the decision in the hands of the actor. A
patient can, after hearing the reasons for attending music therapy,
freely decide to accept or reject the persuader's line of argument.
Because these influences do not control another's action, they do not
impede voluntariness or autonomy.
Between these extremes lies the third group of influences, which
Faden and Beauchamp define as manipulative.3 3 Manipulative influences are attempts at "noncoercively altering the actual choices available to the person or [at] nonpersuasively altering the person's
perceptions of those choices."134 Manipulative influences have varying
effects on the voluntariness of an act. There is no hard line between
those manipulative influences that substantially interfere with voluntariness (and render a choice nonautonomous) and those that do not.
We have been discussing external forces that render one's actions
less than fully autonomous. While it is not our primary interest here,
it should be noted that forces internal to an individual may also affect
28. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 258.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 256-59.
31. Id. at 257.
32. Id. at 259.
33. See id. at 354-62.
34. Id. at 261.
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the voluntariness of the individual's action. 35 For example, someone
who is claustrophobic may want, but be unable, to step into an elevator. Addictions and severe compulsions may also control a person so
completely that his or her behavior no longer reflects the person.
Behavior so influenced is generally characterized as involuntary.
An example of this devotion to autonomy as free action is the
law of battery, which preceded the doctrine of informed consent. The
physician was obliged to refrain from "battery" (i.e. a non-consensual
touching). She had an obligation to acquire the patient's consent
(explicit or implicit) before performing a procedure. However, there
was no need to provide any information. The requirements of the
physician were completely negative. The patient was free to choose
whether or not to have an operation, and the physician was obligated
to honor that free choice. Recent regulations limiting the restraining
of patients also seem designed to promote autonomy as free action.
There is something plausible about this conception of autonomy.
It seems to explain the intuition that most of one's daily, mundane
activities are, in a certain sense, autonomous. Getting out of bed in
the morning or wearing black rather than brown shoes are intentional
and voluntary activities. This concept also accounts for our view that
most people have at least some capacity for autonomous action. The
requirements for autonomy as free action are minimal. As long as one
has the ability to form preferences and as long as one believes that
one's actions can influence the environment in predictable ways, one
has the capacity to act autonomously. Even very young children and
moderately demented individuals are likely to have sufficient capacity
to act autonomously, at least some of the time, according to this definition. For example, if a moderately demented patient calls out for
food when hungry, there are adequate behavioral grounds for concluding, according to our definition, that this is an autonomous act.
In spite of its inherent plausibility, the above concept of autonomy is of limited use in designing institutional structures that promote autonomy in long-term care. The suggestion that autonomy can
be promoted by minimizing pressures on patients is of some help. It
would clearly rule out some common policies, such as restraining
patients in their wheelchairs. We will discuss below some of the
autonomy problems in long-term care settings, which cannot be dealt
with in a free action model. However, it is worth noting here that the
largely negative construct of not interfering with someone else, which
is the core of autonomy as free action, is not very helpful to someone
35. John Christman, Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self, 25 S. J. PHIL. 181
(1987); Timothy Duggan & Bernard Gert, Voluntary Abilities, 4 AM. PHIL. Q. 127 (1967).
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whose life is largely devoid of meaningful relationships and activities.
Moreover, most such patients, if they were able to function independently with no interference from the outside, would not be living in a
nursing home. A more positive conception of autonomy is needed.
C. Autonomy as Effective Deliberation
Effective deliberation consists of making a decision based on an
adequate understanding of the situation and the possible alternative
courses of action.36 This sense of autonomy is distinct from autonomy as free action. A person can act voluntarily and intentionally
without effectively deliberating and understanding the relevant issues.
Autonomy as effective deliberation emphasizes acting based on an
understanding of the situation, the action, its consequences, and possible alternatives.
This model of autonomy is most clearly enshrined in the legal
concept of informed consent. In its decision in Canterbury v.
Spence," the D.C. Circuit spelled out the leading legal framework of
informed consent. It specified that the physician should disclose to
the patient all information that a reasonable person would want to
know prior to making a decision, including the risks, benefits, nature,
purpose of, and alternatives to, any contemplated procedure.
While some attack this model as legally far-reaching, it falls considerably short of an ethical ideal because it requires only disclosure.
Truly autonomous activity requires more than simply receiving the
relevant information; one must understand it. What do we mean by
"understanding an act"? Faden and Beauchamp offer the following
definition:
A person has a full or complete understanding of an action if
there is a fully adequate apprehension of all the relevant propositions
or statements (those that contribute in any way to obtaining an appreciation of the situation) "that correctly describe (1) the nature of the
action and (2) the foreseeable consequences and possible outcomes
that might follow as a result of performing and not performing the
3a
action.
This definition is idealistic. Most decisions are not made with
perfect understanding and, thus, are not perfectly autonomous. The
extent to which someone understands an action will depend on the
complexity of the decision at hand, what one is told about it, what
one's preconceptions were before considering the issues, one's mental
36. See Miller, supra note 26; FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27.
37. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 27, at 251.
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capacities at the time, the time one has to analyze the problem, and
other situational variables. A decision made after careful analysis is
more fully considered than a hurried decision, made with limited
information and under some stress. This conception of autonomy
admits of degrees. The more fully one understands one's action, the
alternatives, and their consequences, and the more one makes a decision based on this information, the more autonomous the action is.
There are also different meanings of the term "understand." One
meaning is that the patient can "grasp the meaning" of relevant
facts.39 Other conceptions of "understanding" suggest that one must
appreciate the nature, significance, and implications of these facts for
one's life situation.' For example, cancer patients sometimes consent
to chemotherapy after being told, and apparently understanding, that
it will make them feel sick. Later they feel that they did not make an
informed decision when they experience the intensity of the side
effects. The more completely people appreciate the consequences of
their actions on their lives, the better they understand their situations,
and thus, their decisions will more precisely meet the criteria for
autonomy as effective deliberation.
Autonomy as effective deliberation, however, requires more than
understanding. Effective deliberation requires that the actions that
the individual proposes to take must have some likelihood of achieving the desired result. Consider, for example, an otherwise healthy
70-year-old woman who says that her primary health care goal is to
live as long as possible. Imagine this woman develops breast cancer.
Even if she understands the risk and benefits of a mastectomy for
localized cancer, her refusal to undergo surgery because she is phobic
of anesthesia would be considered ineffective because she has irrationally weighed the risks of anesthesia.
This notion of autonomy is most relevant when a person is facing
a significant decision with clearly identifiable options. It is no surprise
that this notion of autonomy has been most extensively relied upon
with hospitalized patients in need of surgery or some other discreet
procedure. In these situations, a patient is faced with a decision that
has major consequences and risks the physician can describe to the
patient. The patient, having acquired this information, can effectively
deliberate about what, given her values, she wants to do.
This model of autonomy underlies much of the recent legislation
designed to promote patient autonomy. The best example is the
39. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1994 (2d ed. 1979).
40. See APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 1, at 85.
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recent Patient Self-Determination Act.4 This bill was designed to
ensure that patients are informed of their rights to refuse medical
treatment and of the rule of advance directives in clinical decisionmaking. The law requires that all patients admitted to health care
facilities and nursing homes receive this information. The underlying
goal was to promote effective deliberation surrounding issues of terminal care, death and dying.
We noted earlier that our observations of nursing homes raised
serious questions in our minds about the above models of autonomy.
In order to clarify, we need to digress briefly and summarize some of
the observations from our empirical study. This study used ethnographic methods, and a systematic computerized analysis of the field
notes, to describe the life situations and routines of elderly residents of
two nursing home units and an independent living residence. The
results of that study should help clarify why we find the above models
of autonomy ineffective for a discussion about promoting autonomy in
long-term care settings.
IV.

AUTONOMY AND THE "TOTAL INSTITUTION"

First, we were surprised by the lack of ethical decisions, as traditionally defined, that patients faced. During the study period we saw
no problems with foregoing life support, no disputes regarding confidentiality, and no dilemmas regarding informed consent. Even disputes regarding patients' dispositions occurred more rarely than we
would have guessed.
Rather than finding discrete decisions that raised ethical issues,
we became increasingly concerned about the effect of the entire environment on autonomy. While no single situation was ethically problematic, we found that the cumulative effect of living in the nursing
home adversely affected the patient's ability to live an active and selfdirected life. As the study progressed, we became increasingly convinced that the nursing home is a type of environment that the soci42
ologist Erving Goffman once described as a "total institution.
Total institutions are people-processing organizations that involve
their "inmates" in a twenty-four hour a day living and working situation that is largely cut off from the outside world. Goffman notes
that:
A basic social arrangement in modern society is that the individual
tends to sleep, play, and work in different places with different co41. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4751, 104 Stat. 1388-204 (1990).
42. ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 1-124 (1961).
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participants, under different authorities, and without an over-all
rational plan. The central features of total institutions can be
described as a breakdown of the barriers ordinarily separating
these three spheres of life .

.

.43

Among the different types of organizations which Goffman classifies as "total institutions" are mental hospitals, nunneries, military
training camps, preparatory schools, concentration camps, orphanages and "old age homes."' All of these seemingly diverse institutions similarly affect individuals' lives. We believe that the nursing
home we studied closely approximates Goffman's "total institution."
While nursing homes do not meet every characteristic of a "total
institution," they still can be classified as such. Goffman suggested
that total institutions substantially undermine personal autonomy.45
"Total institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil
society have the role of attesting to the actor and those in his presence
that he has some command over his world-that he is a person with
'adult' self-determination, autonomy and freedom of action."46
Goffman identifies two different sets of features of total institutions, both of which apply to nursing homes. These features also help
explain the negative effect of nursing homes on elderly participants'
autonomy. The first set of features Goffman notes involve those social
processes that undercut individuals' sense of themselves as having
independent and valuable identities. 47 One such process is the stripping of the individual of a private identity through such categorizing
and processing of the individual's life as history taking or fingerprinting. The nursing home patients we observed had their identities
reduced from people with long and complex psychosocial histories to
patients who were largely known by the medicalized stories recorded
in their charts. The stories were rich in medical detail but contained
little about the person. Moreover, their rooms were furnished identically with hospital stock furniture. Patients were not permitted to
bring identity tokens such as furniture, family photographs or other
valued personal possessions to the nursing home. Autonomous identity was further weakened by an almost total lack of privacy. For
instance, patients all shared rooms whose doors were continuously
left open. Patients spent their entire day in the company of other
patients and staff with whom they had no prior personal ties.
A second feature of total institutions that undercuts the indepen43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 5-6.
at 4-5.
at 13.
at 43.
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dence of the individual is the loss of control over routine features of
their lives. For residents of the nursing home that we observed, all
aspects of their lives were conducted in the same place under the
direction of a single staff. Patients rarely left the nursing home, and
they ate, slept, and spent their waking hours all within the same building. Patients' daily routines-their rising in the morning, mealtimes,
and bedtimes-were highly scheduled by staff. The staff was responsible for maintaining a routine that insured the institution complied
with regulatory requirements and which minimized staff time commitments. The staff was allowed considerable power to make wideranging decisions about the patients' lives. Staff-patient interactions
consisted almost exclusively of patients asking staff for permission and
never the reverse. Whenever there was disagreement between patients
and staff, the staffis viewpoint prevailed. Patients were not included
in either formal or informal decisionmaking processes.
V.

AUTONOMY:

CITY-STATES AND INDIVIDUALS

To understand the ramifications of such observations, let us
return now, briefly, to the initial meaning of the word "autonomy."
Self-governance in the Greek city-states was always a tenuous situation, but one they were intensely proud of. But of what did self-governance consist? It was essential for each city-state to have its own
government with the capacity to make its own decisions. Any given
political system benefits if the decisions it makes are based on a factual reading of the situations in which the polity exists. In our terms,
any polity is better off if it can "effectively deliberate." But a political
system that makes decisions based on an independent understanding
of factual information is not the only requirement for an autonomous
state to exist. Such a state requires a variety of other factors including: (1) a viable political culture with a strong sense of independent
identity; (2) a sense of direction or mission about the future nature of
the state, including both what it will do for its citizens and its relations with the outside world; and (3) a series of alliances and external
supports which provide both a sense of protection from hostile forces
and economic trading connections.
This is not a novel analysis. Similar observations are found in
Greek political philosophy and modern political science. What we
are suggesting is that the requirements for the autonomy of a political
entity are a helpful analogy for thinking about the autonomy of
patients in nursing homes. The analogy suggests that one needs to
think about a variety of issues underplayed in the medical ethics literature on autonomy.
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Goffman's observations on total institutions and our observations
on nursing homes suggest that the features of an autonomous polity
are absent from a nursing home patient's living situation. While the
nursing home itself may have a limited amount of political autonomy,
the nursing home patient does not. This suggests that one needs to go
beyond the three models discussed above when deciding what autonomy means and how to provide it in a nursing home.
One might, of course, object that there is a difference between
saying that the above preconditions are necessary for an autonomous
individual and that they are part of the definition of autonomy.
Indeed, did we not just concede that it is essential for any autonomous
entity to be able to effectively deliberate? Such an objection is justified, but limited. One can define an apple by describing its color, size
and shape, but by omitting that apples grow on trees and are edible,
one has missed essential features of the phenomenon under consideration. The definition of autonomy does not require the above preconditions, but a definition that ignores them ignores a basic feature of
autonomy.
VI.

EXTENDING AUTONOMY BEYOND DECISIONMAKING

We have already seen that the free action model of autonomy is
of limited help in providing ways of organizing the day-to-day life of
nursing home patients to promote autonomy. While the effective
deliberation model is in many ways more sophisticated, it is even less
helpful for our task. The routine life of long-term nursing home
patients lacks discrete, major decisions with clearly identifiable benefits and harms. Only the decisions concerning the outside world, such
as discharge and subsequent placement or selling one's house, constitute problems of the sort for which one might expect autonomy as
effective deliberation to be the appropriate model. For the life of most
nursing home patients, the effective deliberation model is largely irrelevant. The major autonomy problem for nursing home patients is
precisely the lack of things about which to effectively deliberate.
There are few meaningful choices for patients in nursing homes for
which it is reasonable to suggest that the staff should carefully inform
the patient about the risks, benefits, nature, purposes and alternatives.
It is this absence of things with substantial meaning for patients that
is ethically problematic and that needs to be included in a conception
of autonomy.
Equally problematic for our goal of promoting autonomy in the
nursing home setting is that neither the free action model nor the
effective deliberation model give any indication of identity corroding
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features in nursing home organizations. If a strong independent sense
of self is as essential to autonomy as the Greek city-state metaphor
suggests, then our model of autonomy should not ignore features of
the nursing home that are corrosive of such a sense.
VII.

AUTONOMY AS CONSISTENCY

The discussed conceptions of autonomy focus on isolated, discrete acts. This analysis, while valuable, has limited applicability for
our purposes. Rather than focus on discrete decisions, the analysis of
autonomy in long-term care must deal with patterns of living precisely because it is about long-term care. A person's life is not merely
a series of individual acts without connection. Human activity is
more integrated than that. Autonomous acts are accomplished by
people who have a past, a present and a future. People have goals and
interests that bind their activities together in coordinated ways.
Reading a book, learning to cha-cha, and getting a Ph.D. are groups
of activities of varying length, complexity and importance. Individual
actions take on added meaning in the context of a person's long-term
goals. Someone whose actions are both free and based on effective
deliberation, but who has no long-term goals, no sense of past or present commitments to call her own, seems more like a computer than an
autonomous person. Knowledge of these larger goals may also shed
light on the reasons for what appeared to be, given the other criteria,
less than fully autonomous behavior. For example, a person may not
spend time trying to understand everything about a particular decision because, in the scheme of that person's life, the decision is not
critically important. Thus, although the decision seemed less autonomous, given the criteria for effective deliberation, when one evaluates
the act in light of a person's long-term concerns, the behavior seems
more autonomous. A 50-year-old woman, who resentfully spends
much of her time caring for her aged parents rather than returning to
her career, might be said to be acting non-autonomously in a free
action framework. Yet she may well be acting autonomously from a
consistency perspective if the original commitment to care for them
was freely undertaken.
A different way to think of autonomy is to consider how actions
fit together. Instead of analyzing the autonomy of an action as an
isolated unit, autonomy can be analyzed in terms of people's longterm goals, current commitments and past activities.48 As Gerald
48.
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Dworkin puts it:
This view of autonomy focuses not on individual decisions one by
one, but the place of each decision in a more general program or
picture of the life the agent is creating and constructing, a conception of character and achievement that must be allowed its own
distinctive integrity.49
The following analogy may be helpful. Imagine trying to understand sentences or paragraphs in a novel merely by analyzing the constituent words and phrases in isolation from other sentences and
paragraphs. Every sentence of the story may be well-written, clean,
concise and reasonable. Yet, this limited reading alone would not tell
if the story is well-written or if the characters make sense in light of
the rest of the story. To analyze the novel's quality, one would have
to determine if the elements of the story made sense in terms of the
story line as a whole. The same is true of autonomy. To assess
whether a particular action is truly an autonomous act requires examining the context in which the act occurs. We have therefore tried to
develop a conception of autonomy that takes into consideration a
fuller, more integrated picture of a person's life. In this sense, we are
taking a novelist's view of an action. It can only be understood in
terms of the individual's history, the story in which he currently sees
himself involved, and the long-term direction in which he orients his
life.
This approach to autonomy assesses the autonomous character
of one's life rather than the autonomy of each individual act. This
concept seems most relevant to our task of ameliorating the impact of
a nursing home setting on the autonomy of the elderly. Life in such a
setting, we have shown, is characterized not by major decisions with
significant impact on individuals' lives, but by mundane activities that
require little or no conscious decisionmaking.
Our alternative conception of autonomy, autonomy as consistency, emphasizes that the autonomous activity be consistent with an
individual's commitments, values and life plans-that the person's
activities are roughly consistent with the individual's self. It is an
individual's involvement with, or acceptance of, an activity or series
of activities that makes them autonomous. Autonomy as consistency
places special emphasis on the coherence between the activity in question and the patterns of activity and commitment with which one has
been, is, or foresees oneself involved in over the long term.
There are three basic dimensions of an act's consistency. The
first concerns how the action fits in with the person's past activities49. See Dworkin, supra note 47, at 24.
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roughly whether an individual is acting in character °--and how consistent the act is with personal historical values. The second dimension deals with current values. The third concentrates on future goals
and enterprises.
The initial, historical, concept of autonomy as consistency is
exemplified in comments such as "it's just like Mom to not want to go
to the dance" or "Dad was always a stubborn guy." One looks at
both the activities the individual has engaged in and how they were
engaged in, e.g. enthusiastically or reluctantly, and also at the person's previously stated goals and motivations, in order to determine
whether or not an activity is autonomous.
This view of consistency captures our belief that a person's existence is more than a random collection of choices and acts. Instead, a
person is an entity that develops within relatively persistent and
enduring patterns. The problem with an over-reliance on this one
dimension of consistency is that it suggests that a person's self is
largely static and does not change over time. In other words, a retrospective analysis of autonomy does not allow for autonomous changes
in a person's life and direction. One's goals and commitments can
change as one ages, gathers new experiences, or finds oneself in different circumstances and with different companions. However, in spite
of its limitations, this retrospective concept of consistency is sometimes the only relevant dimension, as with a severely demented
patient who can no longer give us reasons for what seem to be inconsistent actions. Thus, a richer conception of autonomy as consistency
will take into account one's current views and aspirations.
We have mentioned a second type of consistency, one that
defines autonomous activities as consistent with current values and
commitments. One way of conceptualizing this type of consistency is
to focus on the individual's identification with activities. Do I see the
activity as consistent with who I am? Are these activities consistent
with my values and my emotional and personal commitments? The
more one identifies with an activity as one's own, the clearer it is
autonomous. As one's identification with an activity becomes more
remote, the activity is less clearly one's own and, thus, less
autonomous.
Identification makes for only a partial understanding of this type
of consistency. The term "commitment" is intended to refer to the
fact that, as a social actor, one is not always completely free to change
one's mind. A particular patient may wish to go out for a visit to the
50. See Miller, supra note 26, at 24.
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mall but feel like she must stay and keep her depressed and lonely
friend company. While she might be happier if she went to the mall,
relationships involve commitments individuals would sometimes
rather ignore. Assuming that the relationship was undertaken willingly, actions consistent with those commitments are autonomous and
should be honored. Indeed, the absence of such commitments creates
an isolated individual, not an autonomous one.
A final component of autonomy as consistency is consideration
of the activity in light of a person's long-term goals and enterprises.
These can vary from a specific goal, such as learning to play the
piano, to a more encompassing goal, such as becoming a good parent.
Whatever an individual's past or current commitments, human beings
usually live at least partially in the future. Individuals have conceptions of desirable changes that they try to effectuate, both in their own
lives and that of others about whom they care.
When speaking of autonomy as "self-direction," it is important
to remember that a "direction" usually goes somewhere. One needs
to appreciate the directionality of self-direction. Autonomous activity
implies a goal toward which it is directed or an undertaking of which
it is a part. Moreover, such a goal does not have to be focused on
one's self. Many elderly individuals are deeply committed to working
for their churches and their communities, to say nothing of their families. Assuming such commitments are freely made, they may be
important parts of the individuals' autonomous selves.
Of course, an elderly nursing home patient, who is weak from a
long confinement and whose social relations have deteriorated as her
peers have died and her children moved away, may have a limited
horizon. Unlike a younger person, who has at least some plans for the
years ahead, the patient may only plan for the next few weeks. However, that does not limit the importance of the consistency of her
action with her limited long-term goals.
Whether or not a particular act is autonomous can depend on
one's feeling about an undertaking and its effect on one's self. One's
commitment to an enterprise may change, thereby changing one's
assessment of an activity. For example, Ms. Jones may autonomously
undertake to learn to play the piano. However, as she begins to learn
how to play, she realizes that while she likes the attention she gets
from the other residents of the nursing home, she does not like to play
the piano. Playing the piano takes a great deal of time. She realizes
that learning to play the piano means that she will have to give up
other activities she really enjoys. Soon she wishes that she had never
played the piano. However, she continues to play because the staff,
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believing that playing expresses an interest in life and a commitment
to the future, repeatedly encourages her to continue even when she is
reluctant. While she may have contemporaneous commitments to
play at a concert that afternoon everyone has been planning for, she
clearly cannot be held to a recital two months away. This example
shows the complex relationship between an undertaking, self-identity
and autonomy. Mrs. Jones' loss of commitment to learning to play
the piano changes an autonomous activity into a largely non-autonomous one.
Consistency is not the sole definition of autonomy. 5 Just as
effective deliberation does not deal with the relationship of an act to
the individual's broader life circumstances, so does the consistency
criteria not provide a very good basis for understanding the autonomy
features of the act itself. Unlike the free action criterion, consistency
says relatively little about the moral acceptability of pressures that
come to bear on an individual's goals or behavior. Thus, any complete theory of autonomy for the elderly must deal with questions of
free action, effective deliberation, and consistency.
For our purposes-describing the impact of institutional structures on autonomy-"consistency" provides a particularly useful
framework. It suggests that past legal reforms designed to promote
autonomy will not have a significant effect on the real lives of elderly
persons living in nursing homes. The question thus becomes what
kinds of legal reforms would have an effect?
This is a difficult subject, one for which we neither have the
expertise nor the space to discuss adequately. We are pessimistic that
legislation regarding the living conditions of elderly nursing home residents can ever solve the problem. The law is a blunt instrument
when it comes to modifying interpersonal relationships. It sets minimal standards for human behavior and is not well-suited for encouraging nursing homes to pay more attention to their occupants' actual
goals and commitments. Given these attributes, we are uneasy about
urging new legislation. The history of legislation in this field has been
to pass laws which, while consuming a large percentage of the staff's
52
time and energy, do very little to promote autonomy.
Legislation is better suited to ensuring that nursing homes meet
certain minimal safety criteria. While this is important, we think it is
equally important that safety not be viewed as the only significant
value in nursing homes. One should bear in mind that legislation
51. Daniel Callahan, Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession, 14 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 40-42 (1984); Collopy, supra note 17; see Dworkin, supra note 47.
52. ROSALIE KANE & ARTHUR CAPLAN, EVERYDAY ETHICS 296-309 (1990).
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designed to promote safety may serve to decrease autonomy. Elderly
persons may be willing to take some risks to lead what they consider a
fuller life.
Similarly, legislation requiring higher standards for employees of
nursing homes should be examined quite critically. One must remember that nursing homes are, for most occupants, homes, not long-term
hospitals. From our experience, health care personnel's preoccupa53
tion with "body care" limited their attention to patient autonomy.
Instead of concentrating on qualifications, legislation would be more
profitably directed at raising nursing home employees' benefits, thus
encouraging persons to enter and remain in the field.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that if one is to promote autonomy, either
through law or less formal means, it is important to appreciate the
complexity and mutual embeddedness of human activities. At least in
the nursing home context, treating autonomy as the property of isolated acts seems unhelpful in dealing with the profoundly anti-autonomous features of total institutions. One needs a more complex model
of autonomy precisely because these features have nothing to do with
a lack of information and are only modestly related to the presence of
coercive pressures.
We have tried to show that a truly autonomous human being is a
complex person with a history, a set of values, commitments, and an
image of an intended future. If promotion of autonomy is a serious
legal and ethical goal, one must recognize that it cannot be achieved
by a simple formulaic analysis of discrete acts made by allegedly
"rational" people, whose life involvements do not extend beyond their
privately held and entirely personal preferences. Our model of autonomy as consistency is intended as a modest step in that direction.
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